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Abstract 
Each time an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) 
is used in the sea there is a non-zero probability of 
loss. Quantifying probability of loss is not an exact 
science; therefore much depends on the fault history 
of the vehicle, the operational environment and the 
complex relationships between the consequences of 
faults or incidents and the environment. While this 
problem may be stated in scientific terms, in practice, 
there is no solution through scientific means alone. 
This is an example of ‘trans-science’. We suggest that 
an approach based on the formal process of eliciting 
expert judgement may be an effective means of 
approaching this problem, as the process has been 
used successfully for other trans-scientific questions. 
The paper provides an introduction to the process of 
eliciting expert judgement, outlines four exemplar 
environments: coastal, open water, under sea ice and 
under shelf ice, and gives a worked example of one 
expert’s judgement on the probability of loss in the 
four environments arising from a real fault with the 
Autosub1 AUV. Using the fault history of the 
Autosub3 AUV, included in the Annex, we ask 
experts from among UUST attendees (and others) to 
take part in this expert judgement elicitation. Based 
on the results of this elicitation we aim to publish a 
paper in the peer-reviewed literature. 
  
1. Introduction 
On 16 February 2005 the Autosub2 AUV was lost 
beneath 250 m of ice, some 15 km from the seaward 
edge of the Fimbulisen ice shelf in Antarctica 
(Nicholls et al., 2006). The subsequent formal Loss 
Inquiry made a series of recommendations (Strutt, 
2006). Two key recommendations were that a risk 
management strategy, tuned to the needs of an AUV 
group, should be developed, and that reliability 
analyses should be undertaken prior to future Autosub 
campaigns. With Autosub3 now in service, and with 
scientists funded for research that would take the 
vehicle to Antarctica - under an ice shelf - it is  
 
 
imperative that a Risk Management Process (RMP) 
suitable for AUV operations in hazardous 
environments be developed, tested, and applied. 
Moreover, we recognise that under ice is not the only 
hazardous environment, for example, operations in 
coastal waters, with attendant shipping traffic, shoals, 
the shoreline and environmental factors such as fog, 
also present challenging hazards for safe and 
successful AUV operation. Therefore for an RMP to 
be useful it should be capable of addressing risk in 
varied operating environments. 
A draft RMP-AUV has been designed along the 
lines outlined in Strutt (2006). Embedded within the 
RMP-AUV is a mechanism for the responsible owner 
to make decisions on the acceptable risk of proposed 
AUV campaigns (Trembanis and Griffiths, 2006; 
Griffiths and Trembanis, 2007). The process assists 
the owner in reaching a decision by deriving a 
quantitative estimate of the acceptable risk of loss 
based purely on financial considerations that include: 
vehicle capital and operating costs, use to date 
(depreciation) and appetite for risk. Against this 
acceptable risk of loss the owner needs to compare 
the likely risk of loss for the vehicle on the proposed 
campaign. This risk comes from the operating 
environment (e.g. open water, coastal, under sea ice, 
under shelf ice) and from the consequence of 
faults/incidents with the vehicle. 
There are difficulties in providing quantitative 
estimates for both these factors. Arriving at 
quantitative estimates of these factors is an example 
of problems termed ‘trans-scientific’ by Weinberg 
(1972)
1
, in that the problems can be stated in 
scientific terms but, in practice, they cannot be solved 
through scientific means alone. Risk from the 
operating environment is generally poorly understood 
and rarely quantified, although a ranked list of risk 
from the environment could well be agreed – under 
                                                           
1 This is not an easy text to find in the original, see 
http://garfield.library.upenn.edu/classics1991/A1991GB067
00001.pdf for a commentary.  
  
shelf ice is likely to be the highest risk and open 
water the least. With the vehicle, there are two major 
issues. First, determining the reliability of the vehicle 
and second translating reliability into risk of loss. 
Stokey et al. (1999) tackled the reliability of early 
Remus vehicles in a qualitative manner. Griffiths et 
al. (2003a, 2003b) and Podder et al. (2004) used a 
statistical approach for Autosub2 and Dorado 
respectively, while Chance (2003) plotted the 
pragmatic quantity ‘availability’ against time for their 
HUGIN AUV. A formalized statistical approach for 
reliability analysis of the ‘Fetch’ class DOERRI AUV 
has also recently been adopted and implemented 
(Trembanis and Griffiths, 2006). Despite these 
analyses, the statistical approach used with Autosub2 
has been criticised by some for being based on only 
one vehicle. However, we contend that there is merit 
in a thorough statistical analysis of the through-life 
reliability and fault history of a single entity such as 
Autosub.  
The second major issue, translating reliability 
estimates into risk of loss, has also been contentious. 
It relies on expert judgement on the significance and 
potential impact of faults or incidents, taking into 
account the operating environment, an assessment 
that may be rife with speculative interpretation. In 
Griffiths (2003a) for an under sea ice campaign, and 
in Griffiths and Trembanis (2007) for an under shelf 
ice campaign, the assessment expert forming the 
judgement (Griffiths) was closely associated with the 
Autosub development team. This is clearly open to 
criticism. However, it should be noted that the 
engineering trials and the reliability assessment were 
undertaken as distinct and separate tasks. The 
technical team prepared and conducted the trials 
campaigns and provided a written report on each 
mission. Griffiths performed an initial analysis alone, 
but refined his initial estimates through back and 
forth communication with the technical team. 
Trembanis considers that this approach is a strength 
and not a liability. However, the expert judgement 
process itself was only semi-formal, certainly when 
compared to the process characteristics described by 
Otway and von Winterfeldt (1992) and outlined in 
sections 2 and 3 below.  
As a response to these criticisms, in this paper, 
our aims are: 
(a) To use a more formal approach to eliciting 
expert opinion on the risk of loss of Autosub3 
in different operating environments. 
(b) To widen the pool of expert opinion brought 
to bear on this subject. 
(c) To engage with the AUV community on the 
usefulness of eliciting expert judgement in 
risk management. 
There is an extensive literature on eliciting expert 
judgement (e.g. O’Hagan et al. (2006) and its 39 page 
bibliography). A substantial body of work on eliciting 
expert judgement arose from major studies on nuclear 
reactor safety after the Three Mile Island accident and 
other events in the United States in the 1980s 
(Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1991; Otway and von 
Winterfeldt, 1992). More recently, O’Hagan et al. 
(2006) give examples of expert elicitation in medicine 
(e.g. diagnosis and treatment decisions, clinical trials, 
survival analysis), veterinary science, agriculture (e.g. 
crop yields), meteorology (e.g. severe weather 
conditions), business studies, economics and finance 
(e.g. outcomes of organisational change, error rate in 
auditing), engineering (e.g. structural safety). One 
particularly good engineering example is that of 
eliciting beliefs on the maintenance needs and costs 
associated with water treatment plants. 
In this paper we will take ideas from the expert 
judgement literature and adapt them to use with 
AUVs. Our approach is to ask a wide range of experts 
from the AUV community (at UUST 2007 and 
elsewhere), with a diversity of backgrounds and 
opinions, to receive a degree of training in expert 
elicitation (this paper, its references and the 
associated presentation) and to complete a pro forma 
questionnaire (Annex A). This questionnaire includes 
a list of all faults and incidents with Autosub3 to date 
as the input data and asks the experts to (a) assess 
probabilities of the faults/incidents leading to loss in 
different environments and (b) to assess their own 
level of confidence in making each assessment. It is 
our intention to use the experts’ assessments, 
anonymously and aggregated, as the basis for a 
journal paper. We welcome feedback on the 
usefulness of this approach and on what should be 
included for the journal paper.  
 
2. Expert Judgement 
2.1 Background/Types of approach 
“Engineering judgement is often applied to bridge the 
gap between hard technical evidence … and unknown 
characteristics of a technical system”  
Cooke and Goossens (2004). 
 
Intuition and judgement permeate all scientific and 
engineering analysis from very basic decisions such 
as what to study and what techniques to adopt to 
more complicated assessments such as safety and 
forecasting (see Otway and von Winterfeldt, 1992 
and O’Hagan et al., 2006). One approach to dealing 
with inherent complexity and uncertainty is through 
the utilization of expert judgement. Expert judgement 
is a process by which the opinions of experts are 
  
brought to bear on issues that involve some measure 
of science/engineering and policy. In basic terms, 
expert judgement is any process in which one 
undertakes consultation with one or more experts that 
have experience with similar projects to your own.  
Expert judgements can, and routinely are, 
employed in a host of varying manners, from round 
table discussions (Sachman, 1974) to more formalised 
forecast assessments such as the Delphi Method 
(Linstone and Turoff, 2002). There is an extensive 
body of literature regarding expert judgement and the 
curious reader is directed to the work by Otway and 
von Winterfeldt (1992) (and references therein) as a 
well-written introduction to the topic. 
Expert judgement requires the synthesis of 
opinions of experts in a subject where there is 
uncertainty due to insufficient data, when such data is 
unattainable because of physical constraints or lack of 
resources (Otway and von Winterfeldt, 1992; O’Hagan 
et al., 2006). Expert judgement or expert elicitation is 
essentially a scientific consensus methodology. 
Expert judgement is often used in the study of rare 
and/or highly controversial events. Expert elicitation 
allows one to parameterize and quantify the 
uncertainty as an ‘educated guess’, for the topic under 
study. 
2.2 Process- steps 1-7 
In their 1992 paper, Otway and von Winterfeldt 
enumerate seven stages to the process of expert 
judgement. In the following section we outline briefly 
each step of the process we intend to follow in 
application of this project. Note that although each 
stage is described, by the very nature of our paper, 
not all of the stages can be completed until after the 
completion and subsequent analysis of the pro forma 
questionnaires, in other words the completion and 
success of this venture depends on the participation of 
UUST attendees.  
 
3. Applying Expert Judgement 
Elicitation of expert opinion through a questionnaire 
is acknowledged to be more difficult than through a 
face-to-face, one-on-one interview, O’Hagan et al. 
(2006: 26). However, by keeping the question to be 
asked simple, we intend to avoid the pitfalls of 
potential misunderstanding. Asking for self-
assessment on the level of confidence for each 
estimate also reduces the aggregated effect of those 
judgements where the expert feels less certain. We 
have also tested the questionnaire and the description 
of faults and incidents on three graduate students with 
some knowledge of AUVs (one in the UK and two in 
the US). We have incorporated their feedback on the 
questionnaire. 
3.1 The Issues 
Given the set of facts on faults and incidents with 
Autosub3 throughout its life to date, described in 
Annex A, we seek to predict the probability of loss of 
the vehicle in different operating environments. At 
issue is how likely is it that each fault or incident, 
taken in isolation, but with the expert’s knowledge of 
the wider issues, could lead to loss in the four 
example environments. The actual question to be 
asked of each fault or incident is set out formally in 
section 3.3. 
3.2 Selecting Experts 
For many (but by no means all) of the judgements 
asked for on individual faults or incidents there is 
likely to be a degree of uncertainty over the response. 
It is here that the experience, background, and insight 
of the individual expert are most important. As a 
consequence, the success (or not) of the elicitation 
process is strongly dependent on the knowledge of 
the experts. Ideally, according to O’Hagan et al. 
(2006:27), each expert (a) has specific technical and 
domain knowledge (e.g. closely involved in AUV 
design or operations), (b) is able to approach a 
problem via formal principles (e.g. through causal 
reasoning – the analysis of cause and effect), (c) uses 
established strategies (e.g. questioning/reviewing first 
assessments) and (d) relies more on procedural 
knowledge (e.g. relationships and an appreciation of 
what is important) and less on declarative knowledge 
(e.g. facts and simple rules). At the highest level of 
expertise, there is agreement in the literature that 
judgement is intuitive, with “an automaticity of action 
deriving from a wealth of knowledge and 
experience”, that may typically take ten years to 
gather (O’Hagan et al., 2006:54). Experts should also 
have a realistic view of their competence for each 
particular problem. 
Clemen and Winkler (1985) examined the 
precision and value of information elicited from 
dependent and independent sources. If the experts 
within a pool have limited diversity or a strong 
dependence (e.g. from one organisation, or all 
academics), they concluded that this would “have a 
serious detrimental effect on the precision and value 
of the information”. Our aim is to maximise 
independence, with experts from different 
backgrounds, areas of expertise, nationality etc. 
The preceding paragraphs well describe many 
participants at UUST, and it is from such a cohort that 
we seek volunteer experts to take part in this study. 
3.3 Clearly define issues 
One of the key stages in the expert elicitation process 
is the definition of the problem or issue to be judged. 
  
For the purposes of this paper we wish to make the 
stated issue as clear and concise as possible. In the 
course of evaluating each fault log entry, the expert 
respondee is asked to assess the following question, 
“What is the probability of loss of the vehicle in the 
given environment X given fault/incident Y?” 
This question is the key yardstick for the 
evaluation process and a strict and consistent 
adherence to this question will help to maintain a 
level of consistency between responses and 
respondees. It is important also to note that our 
interest in this matter is with respect to the impact of 
the fault on loss of the vehicle, not, for instance, on 
the impact that the given fault might have on science 
delivery, but rather, will this fault lead to the loss of 
the vehicle as a complete system given the 
environmental information and one’s own expert 
opinion. 
3.4 – 3.5 Training the Experts and Eliciting 
Judgements 
One of the main focus points of the symposium 
presentation will be to provide brief training to the 
attendees in the completion of the pro forma 
questionnaire in Appendix A. 
The literature of expert elicitation acknowledges 
that the precision of estimates is improved if experts 
have access to independent information, to allow a 
degree of calibration. We have sought, with limited 
success, such independent information. First, for open 
water and coastal environments Leviathan, a leading 
marine insurance binding authority, have stated that 
they have not paid out on an AUV loss in the last two 
years2. Second, out of some 150 vehicles produced by 
Hydroid, and used in open and coastal waters, and 
under sea ice, we believe that none have been lost3. 
Third, through the early stages of Seaglider 
development and operations, eight out of the first ten 
vehicles were lost, in environments that ranged from 
open water to areas infested with sea ice; of the next 
twelve built, two were lost as of September 20054. 
In order to be of most use to the process it is 
important that those who graciously agree to conduct 
the expert assessment complete the entire 
questionnaire. The questionnaire is envisioned, and 
has been tested, to take approximately 3-4 hours in 
total although it should be stressed that there is no 
                                                           
2 Personal communication, Keith Broughton of Leviathan 
with Griffiths, June 2007. 
3 Personal communication, Graham Lester of Hydroid with 
Griffiths, July 2007. This was the case after a REMUS 100 
AUV ‘lost’ for 10 months was recovered recently, 
essentially intact. 
4 Persoanl communication Charles Eriksen with Griffiths, 
September 2005.  
time constraint for its completion. The fault/incident 
descriptions, it should be noted, are the distillation of 
trials and science missions reports (by Griffiths) and 
thus are by nature concise. Where our students felt 
the initial draft was too terse, we have expanded the 
fault/incident descriptions. It is therefore left to the 
expert assessment of the respondee to determine the 
impact of the given fault. If for some reason one does 
not feel that sufficient description is available then 
this can be reflected both the confidence level of the 
probability assessment and the comments after each 
assessment.  
It is also important for the elicitation process that 
we have a clear sense of the backgrounds and 
expertise of the respondees, therefore the favour of a 
reply to the section in Appendix A entitled “Expert 
Details” is appreciated. It is not necessary, although 
welcome, for respondees to include their name and 
contact details, but anonymous responses are in order. 
Those wishing to make electronic submissions are 
invited to download the MS Word file from 
www.noc.soton.ac.uk/OED/gxg/UUSTRiskPaper.html or 
to contact either of the authors. 
3.6 Analyzing and Aggregating 
Research has shown that many experts, when asked to 
use the full probability range, tend too often to opt for 
values close to 1 or 05, O’Hagan et al. (2006: 68). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that an expert’s ability 
to provide unbiased estimates shows no correlation 
with the expert’s technical or domain expertise. 
However, if experts are aware that particular types of 
faults or incidents have led to loss, or not, their 
subjective judgements may be less biased. This 
outcome feedback is clearly important, and it argues 
for open dissemination of faults and loss within the 
AUV community. 
Handling differences of opinion and a range of 
subjective probabilities is easier than identifying bias. 
In their review of combining probabilities from 
experts, Clemen and Winkler (1999) describe 
mathematical and behavioural combination 
techniques. The Autosub Loss Inquiry used a 
behavioural approach, requiring the experts gathered 
together to interact and produce a single, agreed, 
group judgement (Strutt, 2006). This approach is not 
without its problems, including group polarisation (or 
‘group-think’). 
Where experts do not exchange information, 
mathematical combining techniques are appropriate. 
While current research considers Bayesian belief nets 
to provide a mathematically defensible, rigorous and 
                                                           
5 Indeed Griffiths et al. (2003a) only considered 1 or 0 as 
possible outcomes, while Griffiths and Trembanis (2007) 
considered only 0, 0.25 or 1. 
  
effective way of combining judgements (O’Hagan, 
1998; Sigurdsson et al., 2001), they are challenging to 
implement. As a consequence, our initial approach 
will be to use a simple linear or logarithmic opinion 
pool, Clemen and Winkler (1999): 
where wi is the weight given by expert i (of n) for the 
probability pi (!).  
3.7 Complete analysis and write up 
The complete analysis will document the aggregated 
experts’ judgements on the probabilities of leading to 
loss for each fault and each environment as opinion 
pool means and a measure of spread. Importantly, the 
reasons why experts arrived at their judgements will 
be summarised. Using these sets of probabilities, and 
example AUV campaigns for each environment, we 
will model the overall probability of losing a vehicle 
in each campaign using Kaplan Meier and Weibull 
methods as used in Griffiths et al. (2003a). 
Probabilities of loss will be compared with data from 
independent sources (if available) for coastal/open 
water environments, and with earlier single-expert 
predictions in Griffiths and Trembanis (2007) for 
under ice. 
At this level of detail, which we suggest is 
necessary for this first analysis of AUV faults using 
formal expert elicitation by questionnaire, the results 
will be published as a National Oceanography Centre 
research report and made freely available6. A journal 
paper will be written using distilled information, 
describing the method and the results. 
 
4. Environments 
We have chosen four contrasting environments as 
examples for this study. They were chosen because 
they are well known to us and they represent both 
common and challenging AUV operating 
environments. Clearly the method can be applied in 
other settings, such as near the seabed, in complex 
terrain, or within enclosed environments such as 
pipes, cenotes, or lakes. In the following sub-sections 
are concise notes on key factors from each 
environment that may effect experts’ judgements on 
probability of faults or incidents leading to loss.  
There are some factors that are common to one or 
more environments. Perhaps the most significant is 
the process of launch and recovery, frequently from a 
ship. Incidents during launch and recovery are not 
uncommon; they can, and have, led to loss or write-
                                                           
6 A pdf will be available via http://eprints.soton.ac.uk  
off. The occurrence and impact of such incidents has 
been sufficiently high that some insurance providers 
have suggested co-insurance, or risk sharing, during 
these specific parts of a mission (Griffiths et al., 
2007). 
4.1 Open Water 
Open water, away from the coast and traffic lanes, 
where the water depth is less than the crush depth of 
the vehicle, forms a relatively benign operating 
environment. An emergency response of rising to the 
surface, or descending to the seabed, is feasible, and 
from either location telemetry of data and position is 
possible. Clearly the risks are higher if the water 
depth exceeds the crush depth. While hazards mid-
water are few, on the surface high winds and/or 
waves, fog and other vessels may increase risk and 
the consequences of technical failures in navigation 
or communication systems. Operating close to the 
seabed can be hazardous, placing reliance on collision 
avoidance or altitude-sensing hardware, algorithms 
and software. 
4.2 Coastal 
Coastal settings, defined as waters from the shelf 
edge (150-200 m water depth) and landward towards 
the shore, and including inland waters, can be 
challenging locations for AUV operations. While well 
below crush depth, many challenges remain. This 
setting includes shipping lanes and bay mouths as 
well as the near-shore (just outside of the surf zone), 
and estuaries. Physical hazards in this setting include 
high density ship traffic comprising, among others, 
commercial, military, and personal watercraft; divers 
(recreational and commercial) (Patterson, Sias, and 
Gouge, 2001); engineering structures (e.g. bridges, 
breakwaters, piers, jetties, groins, etc.); fishing gear 
(e.g. pound nets, lobster/crab pots. Environmental 
hazards include turbid waters and strong fluid flows 
(currents and waves) that make search and recovery 
problematic. Coastal settings do, however, afford a 
host of launch/recovery options including ships, boat 
ramps, docks and piers, which can be used in tandem 
or switched to mid-mission as conditions require. 
Shallow depths and strong hydrodynamic flow 
present increased risk for collision and thus place 
added importance on collision avoidance systems. 
The rapid spatial and temporal changes to 
environmental conditions in coastal settings also 
place a premium on navigation and communication 
systems. The proximity to logistical centres, however, 
does provide advantages for operational adjustments 
(e.g. operations can be moved to more benign 
locations and additional support supplies can be more 
readily acquired). 
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For the purposes of the questionnaire, we ask 
experts to consider a semi-open, highly developed 
coastal embayment with depths of 40 m maximally, 
relatively sheltered from waves but subject to tidal 
currents of ~1-1.5 m.s-1. Vessel traffic includes 
commercial and recreational vessels and occasional 
personal watercraft. 
4.3 Sea ice and icebergs 
Sea ice and icebergs pose a wide spectrum of risk that 
merits an expert elicitation study in its own right. 
There are numerous classes or types of sea ice, and 
each may pose a threat of some magnitude to AUV 
operations. Ice types are described by Wadhams 
(2000), and MacDonald (1969) described how ice 
affects vessel operations. More specific information 
on ice types and their effect on AUV operations is 
available on the Polar AUV Guide website7.  
Sea ice and icebergs pose a hazard to AUV 
operations for several reasons: 
• Ice can form a rigid lid to the ocean, hampering 
or even preventing recovery after a technical 
failure or incident. 
• Afloat, deep ice keels and icebergs pose collision 
hazards. If in shallow water, especially if they are 
grounded, ice keels and icebergs may test 
severely the collision avoidance and path 
planning systems within an AUV. 
• Thin ice may pose different hazards: semi-
transparent grease ice may be sufficient to 
hamper visual sighting on recovery; nilas, up to 
10 cm thick, may damage appendages such as 
antennas. 
• Continuous multiyear ice, such as fast ice or 
sikussak can form a barrier as effective as an ice 
shelf (see section 4.4) should an AUV become 
stranded, especially if the support vessel has 
limited icebreaking capability. 
• Ice need not be continuous to pose a threat; brash 
ice can be a hazard during launch and recovery, 
especially to appendages and propeller blades. 
An important factor affecting the level of risk 
posed by sea ice is the icebreaking capability of the 
support vessel as this affects the likelihood of success 
or failure should recovery from under ice become 
necessary. The risk appetite and time allocated for 
search and recovery are also factors, as are the 
availability of supporting tools such as an emergency 
location beacon on the vehicle and whether an ROV 
is on board the vessel to aid recovery. 
Because of the wide range of risks, for the 
purpose of this study, we ask that experts focus on a 
scenario where first year ice dominates (0.3–2.0m 
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 www.srcf.ucam.org/polarauvguide/environment/icetypes.php  
thick), with ice keels to 15m, and sporadic icebergs 
and a support vessel able to break 2 m ice at 2kt. 
4.4. Shelf Ice 
Ice shelves are the floating edges of continental ice 
sheets, and, with a typical thickness of 180 m at the 
seaward edge, form an impenetrable barrier. If an 
AUV becomes stranded under an ice shelf through a 
fault or incident, the chance of recovery must be 
almost zero. An ROV recovery might be possible if 
the stranding was no more than a few hundred metres 
from the ice front. Further in, it is possible to drill 
through the ice (e.g. using hot water), and if the AUV 
position is known accurately a recovery might be 
possible. However, such operations are very costly 
and involve complex logistics. 
Experts should bear in mind, as outcome 
feedback, that only two AUVs have ever attempted 
under ice shelf missions, and both were lost, one on 
its first such mission, the other (Autosub2) on its 
second. 
 
5. Completing the Questionnaire 
5.1 Guidelines to completing the questionnaire 
Experts are asked to adhere to the following 
guidelines in completing the pro forma questionnaire: 
• Plan to allot between 2-4 hours for completion of 
the questionnaire. There is no time limit; this is 
merely a suggestion for planning purposes.  
• Please remember to include a confidence index 
on your response to each fault/incident. 
Confidence indices range between 1-5 with 1 
being a low level of confidence in the assessment 
and 5 being a high level of confidence. 
• Remember to assess the fault/incident with 
respect to probability of loss of the asset 
(vehicle) not simply as a subsystem fault or lack 
of data delivery etc. 
Note that the probability estimate is left to the 
discretion of the respondee with the caveat that values 
are within the natural range of zero and unity. 
Examples of probability responses are: 1/10 (e.g. the 
given fault is likely to lead to the loss of the vehicle 
in 1 out of every 10 missions); 1/100 (e.g. the given 
fault is likely to lead to the loss of the vehicle in 1 out 
of every 100 missions) and so on. Either fractional or 
decimal probabilities are acceptable responses. 
 
 
 
  
 
Estimated probability of leading to 
loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level (1 to 5) for each 
estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Dist 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
0.001 0.003 0.1 0.7 186 34 A software bug that 
manifested itself seven hours 
after launch (and 34km 
travelled) meant that the 
vehicle was stuck in an oval 
pattern (125 by 75m) at its 
correct operating depth. The 
course angle relative to a 
cardinal direction affected the 
time taken for the fault to 
emerge. 7hr was shortest time. 
4 3 3 4 
Ice Shelf: if occurs, a sure loss, but 
reduced from 1 as required mission 
length may be less than time to fault 
emergence. Under sea ice, rescue 
very possible, but not certain. For 
loss in open water, fault would need 
to be compounded by failure of one 
or more of acoustic beacon-
emergency release-ARGOS on 
surface. Coastal assessed higher as 
extra time on surface exposes to 
higher hazard. 
Table 1. An example of a completed fault/incident entry from mission 186 of Autosub1 during a campaign in the 
open waters of the North Sea in 1999. The vehicle was easily found on this occasion by listening on the RV Scotia 
for its acoustic pinger.  
 
5.2 Example Assessment 
Table 1 shows what we would consider to be a well-
completed expert assessment of a real fault that 
happened on Autosub1 in the North Sea in 1999. The 
reasons for the assessments call for knowledge of the 
usual systems to be found on an AUV rather than 
necessarily requiring detailed knowledge of the 
particular sub-systems on Autosub. If general 
knowledge is not adequate in particular cases, then an 
assessment should be attempted, but a lower 
confidence level assigned. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We consider that recording fault histories for AUVs 
is important. It is part of good practice in providing 
immediate feedback to the operating teams on 
performance and reliability and it also leads to an 
ability to model statistically the reliability of one or 
more vehicles. 
In previous papers, we have shown how informal 
expert judgement can be used to estimate probability 
of loss from knowledge of the vehicle fault history. 
However, such ideas have not been without 
controversy; as a consequence, in this paper, we have 
set out a more formal approach to eliciting expert 
judgement based on widely accepted practices 
following a substantial review of the literature. 
Through presenting a full summary of the fault 
history of the Autosub3 AUV, and an introduction to 
expert judgement elicitation, our aim is to obtain a 
broad-based expert assessment of the probability of 
loss of the vehicle in different operating 
environments. As an academic exercise, the process 
and our findings will form the basis of a journal 
paper. More practically, returns from experts will be 
used within the existing Risk Management Process –
AUV to better inform the Director NOCS as to the 
likely risk of loss in sending Autosub3 beneath ice. 
Results will also inform the technical team as to 
which faults/incidents a wide cohort of experts 
consider most likely to lead to loss, and hence which 
areas need to be given priority. 
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ANNEX A – THE FULL RANGE APPROACH 
A Microsoft Word version of this questionnaire may be obtained from http://www.noc.soton.ac.uk/OED/gxg/UUSTRiskPaper.html  
 
Expert Details 
Name (if willing):      Contact email (if willing): 
Nationality or domicile:      Organisation type: 
Area of Expertise:      Years of experience of AUVs: 
 
Table 1 Discovery 295T July 2005 – AUV and other trials in the SW Approaches. 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
    Mission aborted (to surface) due to network failure. 
(Much) later tests showed general problem with the 
harnesses (bad crimp joints).      
 
    
384 
 
1.5 
Loop of recovery line came out from storage slot, long 
enough to tangle propeller.      
 
    385 15.2 Autosub headed off in an uncontrolled way, due to a 
side effect of the removal of the upwards-looking 
ADCP.      
 
    386 26 GPS antenna failed at end of mission. 
    
 
    387 27.2 Homing failed, and the vehicle headed off in an 
uncontrolled direction. Mission was stopped by acoustic 
command. Problem was due to (a) the uncalibrated 
receiver array, and (b) a network message (“homing 
lost”) being lost on the network.  
    
 
 
At this point, you may want to consider what your estimated probabilities of loss arising from each fault or incident would mean for this campaign, which was in 
open water. For each entry, subtract your probability of loss from one, to form probability of survival, then, multiply each together to give the campaign probability 
of survival. Is this overall probability of survival for these faults, in open water, sensible, in your expert judgement? If not, you may want to ‘recalibrate’ your 
judgement on individual faults or incidents and reassess the probabilities.
         
 
Table 2 Terschelling May 2006 – AUV trials in the SW Approaches. 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
    Aborted after 4 minutes post dive, due to network 
failure. Logger data showed long gaps, up to 60s, across 
all data from all nodes, suggesting logger problem.  
    
 
    
388 
 
0.5 
Depth control showed instability. +/- 1m oscillation due 
to incorrect configuration gain setting.     
 
    Vehicle went into homing mode, just before dive and 
headed north. Vehicle mission stopped by acoustic 
command. It was fortunate that the ship-side acoustics 
configuration allowed the ship to steam at 9kt (faster 
rather than 6kt with the towfish) and catch the AUV.     
 
    Separately, homing mode not exited after 2 minutes, as 
expected. It will continue on last-determined heading 
indefinitely – a Mission Control configuration error.     
 
    
389 
 
3 
Problem with deck side of acoustic telemetry receiver 
front end, unrelated to vehicle systems.     
 
    ADCP down range limited to 360m, reduced accuracy 
of navigation.     
 
    GPS antenna flooded. No fix at end point of mission. 
      
 
    
391 
 
31 
EM2000 swath sonar stopped logging during mission. 
     
 
    392 32 As consequence of GPS failure on M391, AUV ended 
up 700m N and 250m E of expected end position.     
 
    393 5 Acoustic telemetry giving poor ranges and no acoustic 
telemetry.     
 
    394 3 Jack-in-the-box recovery float came out, wrapping its 
line around the propeller, jamming it, and stopping the 
mission. Caused severe problems in recovery, some 
damage to upper rudder frame, sub-frame and GPS 
antenna. Required boat to be launched.     
 
         
 
    395 8 Jack-in-the-box line came out, wrapped around the 
propulsion motor and jammed.     
 
    396 4 Current estimation did not work, because minimum 
time between fixes for current to be estimated had been 
set to 15min; leg time was only 10min. Mission stopped 
and restarted with configurable time set to 5min.     
 
    397 4 Main lifting lines became loose, could have jammed 
motor.     
 
    398 8 Operators ended mission prematurely, they believed the 
AUV was missing waypoints. In fact, a couple of 
waypoints had been positioned incorrectly.      
 
 
 
 
         
 
Table 3 Discovery June-July 2006 – Biological measurements in the NE Atlantic 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
    Configuration mistake; ADCP up configured as down- 
looking ADCP causing navigation problems through 
tracking sea surface as reference. This data was very 
noisy and put vehicle navigation out by a factor of 1.5.     
 
    
401 
 
7.5 
 
Damaged on recovery, “moderately serious” to 
sternplane, shaft bent.     
 
    Stern Plane stuck up during attempt to dive, 2d 20h into 
mission. Stern plane actuator had flooded.      
 
    Abort due to network failure. Abort release could not 
communicate with depth control node for 403s. 
Possibly side-effect of actuator or motor problems.     
 
    Motor windings had resistance of 330 ohm to case. 
Propeller speed dropping off gradually during a dive     
 
    Only one position fix from tail mounted ARGOS 
transmitter.     
 
    
402 
 
274 
GPS antenna damaged on recovery. 
     
 
    Recovery light line was wrapped around the propeller 
on surface. Flaps covering the main recovery lines (and 
where the light line was towed) were open.      
 
    Took over 1 hour to get GPS fix at final waypoint. 
     
 
 
403 
 
140 
Propeller speed showed same problem as m402. 
Subsequent testing of motor with Megger showed 
resistance of a few kohm between windings. 
     
         
 
 
 
    Pre-launch, abort weight could not be loaded 
successfully due to distorted keeper. “If not spotted, 
could have dropped out during mission”, considered 
low probability of distortion and not checked.      
 
    
404 
 
75 
Pre-launch, potential short circuit in motor controller 
that could stop motor.     
 
 
    Propeller speed showed same problem as on m402 and 
403.     
 
    CTD drop-out of 1 hour (shorter drop-outs noted in 
previous missions).     
 
    M404 recovery was complicated when lifting lines and 
streaming line became trapped on the rudder (probably 
stuck on the Bolen where the two were attached). 
Recovery from the situation required the trapped lifting 
lines grappled astern of the ship, attached to the gantry 
lines, and the caught end cut.     
 
    The forward sternplane was lost due to lifting line 
trapping between the fin and its flap on recovery.     
 
    
 
 
 
The acoustic telemetry nose transducer was damaged 
due to collision with the ship.     
 
 
 
         
 
Table 4 Terschelling July 2006 – Turbulence studies in the Irish Sea 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
    Fault found pre-launch, LXT tracking transducer had 
leaked water – replaced.      
 
    
405 
 
2.5 
Fault found pre-launch, starboard lower rudder and 
sternplane loose.      
 
    AUV ran slower than expected and speed dropped off 
during mission, due to motor problem. 
    
 
    Current spikes of 3A and voltage drops in first part of 
mission.     
 
    Propulsion motor failed 500V Megger on recovery on 
windings to case.     
 
    One battery pack out of four showed intermittent 
connection.     
 
    Acosutci telemetry unit gave no replies. 
     
 
    On surfacing first GPS fix was 1.2km out. 
     
 
    
406 
 
104 
Spikes in indicated motor rpm 
    
 
    Acoustic telemetry unit gave no replies at all – no 
tracking or telemetry.     
 
    
407 204 
Noise spikes on both channels of turbulence probe data. 
    
 
         
 
 
    Propulsion motor felt rough when turned by hand – 
bearings replaced before deployment.     
 
    Aborted at 50m due to overdepth as no depth mode 
commanded. Unless compounded by another problem,  
this would show itself immediately on first dive.     
 
    No telemetry from Acoustic telemetry unit. 
     
 
    Difficulty stopping Autosub on surface via radio 
command. Separate problems with the two WiFi access 
points.     
 
    
408 
 
302.5 
Still spikes on motor rpm that need investigating. 
    
 
 
         
 
Table 5 Terschelling March 2007 – Deep water AUV reliability proving trials in Norway. 
Estimated probability of leading 
to loss (on scale of 0 to 1), with 
confidence level 1 (lo) to 5  (hi) for 
each estimate in the grey boxes. 
No. Distance 
 (km) 
Fault/incident description Open Coast Sea 
Ice 
Shelf 
Ice 
Reasons 
    409 1.5 No acoustic telemetry or transponding. LXT ship side 
USBL receiver had leaked during mission giving poor 
bearings to sub, replaced with spare.     
 
    410 9 No acoustic telemetry or transponding. 
     
 
    411 128 No GPS fix at the end of the mission. GPS antenna 
bulkhead had water inside and had flooded.     
 
    No GPS fix at end of mission. After next mission, GPS 
fixes started coming in after vehicle power up/power 
down; perhaps problem was due to initialisation with 
receiver – and not this time the antenna.     
 
    
412 
 
270 
Problem at start for holding pattern. Holding pattern 
timed out due to programming mistake.  
    
 
    415 6 Prior to dive, checks showed reduced torque on rudder 
actuator. Actuator replaced with new one - first use for 
this new design of actuator motor and gearbox. 
However, AUV spent most of mission “stuck” going 
around in circles at depth due to rudder actuator fault. 
The new actuator overheated, melting wires internally, 
the motor seized, and internal to the main pressure case, 
the power filter overheated. Some of the damage may 
have been caused by an excessive current limit (3A); 
correct setting was 0.3A. But this does not explain high 
motor current. Possible damage during testing when 
motor stalled on end stop? Compounded by wiring to 
motor held tightly to case with cable ties, and worse, 
covered with tape (acting as an insulator). Wires were 
not high temperature rated. 
    
 
 
         
 
    Three harness connectors failed due to leakage, 
affecting payload systems: EM2000 tube, ADCP_down, 
and Seabird CTD. Despite connector problems the 
system worked without glitches and failed only when 
the power pins had burned completely through on the 
connector feeding power to the abort system     
 
    
415 
 
6 
Although it worked properly at the start of the mission 
at a range of 1200m, the acoustic telemetry stopped 
working at the end of mission. Hence could not stop the 
mission acoustically when needed.      
 
    416 18 Not possible to communicate with vehicle at 1180m 
depth; holding pattern caused a timeout, and AUV 
surfaced. Acoustic telemetry max range was 500m for 
digital data. 
    
 
 
    418 15 When homing was stopped deliberately after 10 min, 
the AUV did not go into a “stay here” mode. Rather it 
continued on the same heading; stopped by acoustic 
command 500m from shore. Cause was incorrect 
configuration of mission exception for homing. Default 
in campaign configuration script was not set due to 
inexperience with new configuration tools.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
